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Summary 
The question as to whether and when the European Union should open accession negotiations 
with Turkey has given rise to a heated debate not just among the political and academic 
communities, but also among the European public at large. Whereas some expect major 
economic and geopolitical benefits from Turkish EU membership, others fear that it would 
change the nature of the European project and destroy its original rationale. This contribution 
throws some light on the issues with an eye on economic theory of optimum integration areas. 
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Introduction 
In its December 2004 meeting, the European Council has decided to start negotiations with 
Turkey culminating in full membership without delay in 2005. This was undoubtedly a historic 
step, the fulfilment of the Turkish Republican dream and -above all- a signal that Europeans want 
to abolish religious barriers to modernity, freedom and the consolidation of peace. Some even 
call it the new world of the 21st century on the basis of common values. But there actually is also 
some water which blurs the wine. For instance, there is the danger that a rational economic 
discussion the economic progress of Turkey during the negotiation period will be superimposed 
by quarrels about the new Constitution and the redefinition of the Growth and Stability Pact and 
other aspects concerning the euro area, not to speak of unanimity with respect to common foreign, 
security and defence policies as well as the inclusion of the Balkan region in the EU. However, 
the area where most prejudices and misperceptions stem from is economics. To check for this, 
one has to look in detail at the economic issues likely to emerge during the process of 
negotiations, assuming that they will start soon. A recent important and excellent publication by 
the Brussels Centre for European Policy Studies titled “The European Transformation of Modern   2
Turkey” analyses the challenges and opportunities arising in the fields of foreign policy, security 
policy, justice and home affairs, domestic governance, macroeconomic policy and income 
convergence, energy, banking and agriculture. The main results related to economic challenges 
which are in my view representative of other studies in the field can be summarized as follows.
1 
General Economics Considerations 
If one inspects Turkey’s economic performance pattern more deeply, an extremely heterogeneous 
picture emerges. Some areas like, e.g., trade integration reveal that Turkey even leads the new 
member countries in some economic fields. However, with respect to other important issues like, 
e.g., formal education of the population, Turkey still suffers from severe backlogs to be 
eliminated urgently within the next years.  Hence, Turkey should be classified as a typical 
transition country which is just moving away from a highly distorted boom-and-bust economy to 
a stable market economy. It seems fair to say that Turkey today is rather open to international 
trade and foreign investment and offers the potential for rapid and sustainable growth. However, 
it remains to be seen whether Turkey’s reform path adopted since 2001 is really sustainable and 
whether the reforms will be fully implemented. In this respect, there is significant uncertainty left 
and the Turkish economy still strongly depends on international financial markets. Any policy 
action assessed as inconsistent by the markets inherently bear the danger to lead to strong 
depreciation of the Lira and an increase in interest rates which could immediately endanger 
macroeconomic stability. 
Despite all these imponderabilities, some clear statements can and should be made in the context 
of the discussion about the potential start of negotiations with Turkey on EU-membership. On the 
one hand, the accession of Turkey would resemble earlier EU enlargement rounds since the 
realisations of the relative GDP per capita and of the weight of agriculture in employment are 
similar for Turkey and for the less advanced Central and Eastern European EU members and 
candidates. As measured by its current economic importance and by its future economic weight 
in terms of current population, Turkey is about twice the prospective 2007 EU-entrants Bulgaria 
and Romania. Since both indicators serve as proxies of the gross receipts of Turkey within the 
framework of the Structural Funds and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the budgetary 
cost of Turkey entering the EU might, thus, as a rule-of-thumb amount to relatively modest 
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values (independent of, e.g., phasing-in issues).
2 On the other hand, there are some aspects which 
legitimise to consider the Turkish case as quite distinct from previous enlargements. 
Advanced but asymmetric trade integration 
The first key property of the Turkish economy is advanced trade integration.  Through its 
asymmetric 1995 customs union agreement with the EU economy which is 20 times larger, 
Turkey participates already now in the EU internal market for goods (but not for labour-intensive 
services) and will anyway adopt significant parts of the acquis independent on the state of 
accession decisions. Thus, the country has arrived at a higher degree of EU integration than the 
CEECs at a comparable stage before their accession, although trade with the EU is somewhat less 
important for Turkey than for some of the larger new member countries. As indicated by the 
increasing share of overall exports to GDP and the constant share of the EU in overall Turkish 
trade, the customs union with the EU did not lead to trade diversion but mainly to trade creation.
3  
Human capital endowment capable of development 
Second, Turkey is endowed with a rather low degree human capital. In this respect, Turkey’s 
scores in variables like total expenditure on education in percent of GDP, the percentage of adult 
population with upper secondary education (e.g., by age groups) deserve a closer look. In terms 
of investment in and output of education, Turkey’s performance is certainly much worse than in 
the EU. However, according to the same criteria, the CEECs perform like the EU average. These 
deficits appear even larger in view of the exceptionally high share of the Turkish school age 
population and its high importance for Turkey’s future growth prospects. Of course, such lack of 
quality might have important negative consequences for Turkey’s future growth path.
4 
Demographics giving leeway for more growth 
Third, Turkey is characterised by demographic dynamism. Turkey’s labour force will continue to 
experience grow rates of more than 1 percent p.a. for at least one other generation. In contrast, it 
currently tends to shrink in many CEECs. This huge discrepancy gives Turkey potentially much 
more dynamism and leeway for growth – not to forget a more founded right to say in different 
EU institutions. Moreover, Turkey’s working age population is currently increasing by 1.5% 
more than the totals population. This implies ample room for redistribution, pension payments etc. 
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until Turkey will experience the same demographic transition to lower demographic dynamics as 
experienced by the EU countries some decades earlier.
5 
Modern and underdeveloped sectors coexist 
Fourth, Turkey is a textbook example of a so-called dual economy. On average, Turkey’s GDP 
per capita is comparable to the Bulgarian and the Romanian one. But an inspection of sectoral 
and regional data reveals that the Turkish economy is divided into a tiny, but exceptionally well-
performing progressive sector outside agriculture (mainly industry and some services) in some 
Western regions which is more productive than even some of the new member countries and a 
large and poor rural sector covering sector approximately half of the labour force. In the 
emerging markets literature this is typically called a dual economy. 
Crisis-prone domestic banking system on the road to recovery? 
Fifth, the domestic banking system is significantly changing now and its development towards a 
supporting pillar for future growth is crucial. As is well-known, foreign banks dominate the 
banking system in most CEECs by now and, thus, tend to import financial stability. However, the 
structure of the Turkish banking system has been more complex for some time with some very 
profitable private banks. However, macroeconomic instability and significant political influence 
on bank management and on the lending culture of public banks during the nineties until recently 
contributed to the malfunctioning of this sector. The fifth and up to now last major 
macroeconomic instability crisis in Turkey since the late fifties happened in 2001. In retrospect, it 
can best be characterized not as a balance-of-payment-crisis like the precedent four crisis 
episodes but as the consequence of persistently high real interest burden on an increasing public 
debt combined with a premature financial sector liberalization. Doubts about the health of the 
Turkish banking system joint with debt-event fears finally induced attacks on the Turkish lira. 
However, this deep banking crisis and its highly visible damaging effects on the economy paved 
the way for unprecedented comprehensive legal and institutional reforms. If stabilisation is 
continued, regulation is effective and banks are supervised along EU norms, the banking system 
might give pervasive support to the further development of the modern part of the Turkish 
economy. But it essential for sound growth that financing investment, trade and additional 
employment is the driving force of bank balance sheet growth. The significant progress of the  
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Turkish banking system in terms of productivity and efficiency over the last three years, as 
measured by the non-interest cost to total asset ratio and the operating-cost to income ratio, gives 
some cause for optimism. Merely in the area of sophisticated capital market products and the full 
use of global capital markets there is ample room for improvement in the Turkish banking 
sector.
6 
Is Turkish government debt overstated? The role of capital flight 
Sixth, external debt and capital flight has been a key feature of the Turkish financial performance 
for decades now. Turkey’s foreign debt burden is higher than for most other new EU entrants or 
EU candidate countries. According to IMF figures, it amounts to around 80 to 100 billion EUR. 
Most of it, around 70 percent, is government debt. Since cumulated current-account deficits since 
1963 have been only slightly above 40 billion, one-half of Turkey’s external debt appears to be 
the result of a significant capital flight, i.e. residents who do not trust their government anymore. 
This pattern even continued recently in spite of exceptionally high real interest rates. It again 
stands in sharp contrast with countries like Romania and Poland which have not experienced 
significant capital flight in spite of continuing current-account deficits. However, this 
constellation offers a great opportunity: if parts of this flight capital could be repatriated it would 
soon become clear that government debt is overstated. This in turn would give Turkey ample 
room for future capital imports and, thus, for high growth.
7 
Dominance of the agricultural sector 
Seventh, the agricultural sector still is a big player in the Turkish economy. Turkey is strongly 
similar to other CEECs (above all Poland and Romania) in that a large part of the work force is 
officially employed in agriculture. One-third of the Turkish labour force is employed in this 
sector but accounts only for about 12% of GDP. Like in other EU countries, this indicates bad 
labour productivity performance of this sector and -to a certain extent- also some potential 
labour-shedding and emigration potential. However, a marked difference to other candidate 
countries consists of the fact that Turkey runs a significant trade surplus vis-à-vis the EU in 
agricultural goods. The main reason is that Turkey -due to a favourable climate- is one of the few 
countries which specialise in products for which the EU does not significantly hamper imports 
(i.e., fruits, vegetables and nuts). In addition, deviating from the CEEC case, some Turkish 
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agricultural products have been protected even more heavily than by the EU. In case of Turkish 
EU membership protection of this sector would be abolished and would, for instance, mean 
increasing farm sizes. Hence, human capital problems in this sectors will become even more 
virulent in the future. The dualistic structure of the Turkish economy becomes obvious again, this 
time in the area of agriculture. A large amount of Turkish exports to the EU can be traced back to 
a minor but progressive sector. At the same time, the remaining sectors employ the vast majority 
of the labour force but is not competitive.
8 
The migration issue: often overstated and misunderstood 
Eighth, emigration from Turkey will not be a menace to the incumbent EU countries. Any 
assessment of this (surprisingly) hotly debated topic should start from an assumption with respect 
to the degree of liberalisation of labour flows between old and new EU-members. There is no 
reason to assume that Turkey will be treated any better or worse than the recent new member 
states. The incumbent EU-15 member states introduced a transition period lasting up to seven 
years (2 plus 3 plus 2) after accession with limited freedom of movement of labor from the 10 
new member states in order to prevent the CEECs from exerting ‘wage dumping’ strategies. 
Under these circumstances, an EU-entry of Turkey in 2015 would imply that Turkey’s labor force 
will be fully mobile not earlier than 17 years from now. However, at that time a new scenario will 
prevail. First, due to population ageing, not only the EU-15 but also the new member countries 
will be plagued by labour shortages instead of unemployment. Second, due to income 
convergence, emigration will not appear as worthwhile as before to Turkish workers. Seen on the 
whole, the current public debate on how large Turkish emigration flows will actually be, seem to 
be exaggerated and misplaced. 
The outstanding importance of institutions and governance 
Ninth, enhancing the quality of Turkish institutions will be crucial for exploiting Turkey’s growth 
potential. The main idea behind the transfer of the acquis communautaire to the new EU member 
states is that the full gains of EU membership can only be reaped if the quality of government 
institutions in the member states is broadly the same. However, improving the quality of 
governance will also lead to a growth dividend as confirmed by a large strand of empirical 
literature on domestic institutions as a determinant of growth. According to the World Bank’s 
well-known indicators of quality of governance (significant control of corruption, effective 
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government, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law and voice and accountability)
9, 
there is still a long way to go for Turkey. This is valid not only vis-à-vis the EU-15 countries, but 
also in comparison with the newer member countries. However, if the quality of governance in 
Turkey is low exactly because the level of development of the country is low this would be no 
drawback for Turkey. Institutions in poorer countries are generally weaker and will become 
stronger in the wake of growth and development of the country. However, Turkey’s realisation of 
the 'rule of law' indicator is even below the level which would correspond with its low present 
GDP per capita. If one considers the change in the World Bank’s composite quality of 
government indicator from 1996 to 2002, it even becomes clear that Turkey is one of the few 
among the current EU member countries experiencing a deteriorating composite index of the 
quality of governance. However, if one tries a final judgment on the quality of Turkey’s 
institutions one should always take into account that the registered improvements in case of the 
Central and Eastern European accession countries were mainly achieved in the wake of the 
accession negotiations. From this point of view, starting membership negotiations with Turkey 
could represent a great chance for improving the quality of governance in this country.
10 
Economic Outlook 
Negotiations with Turkey will turn out to be not easy and full membership will be achieved not 
earlier than after ten years, not at least because European governance is currently quickly 
changing, and Turkey’s sheer size corresponds to that of the 10 EU entrant countries. However, 
Turkey’s potential for strong growth and, hence, rapid convergence gives cause for optimism. In 
the past, Turkey could best be described as a boom and bust economy whose macroeconomic 
volatility has especially in the nineties lead to an option value of waiting with important 
employment and investment decisions and, thus, has reduced growth prospects. In the future, if 
macroeconomic volatility will be removed, Turkey could converge quickly by investment in 
physical capital, investment in human capital and population growth. 
With respect to demographics, the favourable evolution of population composition with an 
increasing proportion in working age is a clear advantage of Turkey. In addition, 
underemployment of labour, above all in the rural areas and among women, can be transformed 
on a large scale into higher productivity activities in industry and services. This factor may 
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account for an additional increase of Turkish GDP per capita close to 1 % per annum and, hence, 
is a typical example of the enormous benefits of integrating two regions with significantly 
different factor endowments. Finally, there is also a potential of acceleration of total factor 
productivity by means of an increase of technology transfers, i.e. by higher FDI. Taking all three 
growth-enhancing factors together, the consensus view appears to be that Turkey has the 
potential to grow faster between 3 and 6% per annum than the EU-15 and between 1 and 3% per 
annum than the new EU member states. 
Seen on the whole, the economic outlook for Turkey is rather promising and the start of accession 
negotiations might be self-enforcing. On the one hand, Turkey is a still very poor country. On the 
other hand, its economy is significantly more dynamic than that of the present EU members. Full 
convergence in terms of income per capita will not be reached in the foreseeable future. But this 
should be no reason to be concerned about the EU accession of Turkey because the recent history 
of the EU and also the EMU has clearly demonstrated that „small is beautiful”. So far, rich ‘core’ 
member countries with very low growth rates like, e.g., Italy and Germany with its permanent 
failure to stick to the stability and growth pact today, have caused significantly more problems up 
to now than poorer but more quickly growing and more dynamic ‘periphery’ states like, e.g., the 
CEECs. 
Several turning points indicate that Turkey should now be on the edge of a more prosperous 
period during which the huge income per capita differential vis-à-vis the EU will be reduced to a 
significantly lower level. This, in turn, will render Turkey’s accession to the EU politically more 
undisputed. The country has launched structural reforms in 2001, experiences inflation rates at 
low levels never seen for decades now and envisages an accession negotiation process which 
might represent a credible anchor for politics (including policies geared towards the adoption of 
the euro) and prevent populist politicians from withdrawing and watering down the reforms. 




Seen on the whole, one of the biggest economic challenges for Turkey is to make its recent 
macroeconomic stabilization sustainable. Of utmost importance in this respect is a significant 
catch-up of quality of institutions and governance to the EU level. Although starting with a small   9
GDP, Turkey could significantly contribute to high growth rates of the EU as a whole (as already 
aimed at by the Lisbon agenda). The analysis of Turkey's human resources has identified a large 
gap in human capital formation and its central role for backlogs in convergence between Turkey 
and the EU. Hence, one important policy conclusion would be to link up pre-accession financial 
support with the accumulation of human capital instead of the usual support of standard 
infrastructure projects. Another example would be in the area of trade integration. For instance, 
enhancing the currently existing customs union with Turkey into the direction of free trade of 
services should generate benefits to Turkey and to the EU which should not be underestimated. 
Finally, one could imagine the implementation of joint and specific transition policies in the areas 
of energy, agriculture and education. 
If Turkey will be able to strictly stick to its reform-oriented path of modernization, nothing 
prevents us from expecting enormous benefits of integrating two regions with significantly 
different factor endowments - a straightforward economic insight not often well understood by 
politicians and the public. 
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